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INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade ago, the author founded Venture Law 
Forum in Tokyo, Japan—a community for lawyers, venture 
capitalists, and other practitioners purposed to gather data and 
observe trends in Japan’s emergent venture capital industry. 
Early in 2010, the forum’s findings were released in a book titled 
Law and Finance of Venture Companies in Japan. Based on years of 
observation and analysis of the Japanese venture industry, the 
author is qualified to speak on the subject of why the venture 
capital industry in Japan has developed differently than its 
Silicon Valley counterpart. 
The most pronounced difference between these two 
situations lies in the incentive bargains between entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists. It has been conclusively shown that US 
entrepreneurs abandon control of their companies while 
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Japanese entrepreneurs do not. Years ago, Bernard Black and 
Ronald Gilson tried to explain the difference by pointing to the 
lack of liquid initial public offering (“IPO”) markets.1 Even 
though there are now multiple liquid IPO markets in Japan,2 
Japanese entrepreneurs are still reluctant to abandon control of 
their companies to investing venture capitalists. While there 
must be many complementary reasons, such as different market 
situations, different social norms, etc., the difference can be 
partly explained by the different legal systems affecting the 
respective venture capital industries.3 
A typical incentive bargain involves human capital 
providers—entrepreneurs—and monetary capital providers 
—venture capitalists (“VCs”)—that agree to invest in the 
creation of a venture company. If one party bears too much risk, 
she will hesitate to invest her capital. In order to maximize each 
party’s respective payoff, both parties are compelled to bargain 
with each other in a fashion that motivates the other to invest 
her respective monetary or human capital. Without a bargain 
that is acceptable to both sides, the venture is likely to fail. 
Moreover, when creating this bargain a typical two-sided agency 
problem must be overcome.4 Control sharing and value sharing 
are at the middle of each incentive bargain in that both parties 
seek a bargain which allows for sufficient control sharing to 
lower potential risk, and value sharing sufficient to incentivize 
each to provide their capital.5 These two aspects of the bargain 
are also complementary each other. 
In Silicon Valley, this two-sided agency problem is resolved 
by having entrepreneurs abandon control to venture capitalists 
and complementarily giving entrepreneurs additional cash-flow 
                                                                                                                
1. Bernard Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998). 
2. See infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
3. Curtis Milhaupt pointed out the existence of legal obstacles in Japan many 
years ago. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: 
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 
887 (1997). 
4. See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra Appendix for a more comprehensive description of the incentive 
bargain. See also Zenichi Shishido, The Incentive Bargain of the Firm and Enterprise Law: A 
Nexus of Contracts, Markets, and Laws, in ENTERPRISE LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND 
LAWS IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN (Zenichi Shishido ed., forthcoming). 
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rights through “sweat equity.”6 In Japan, venture capitalists are 
prevented from gaining control and entrepreneurs are not able 
to take advantage of sweat equity. Because of the two-sided 
agency problem both parties downsize new venture financing 
and are satisfied with smaller success. In fact, Japanese VCs 
invest less than JPY¥100 million (US$1 million) in a company on 
average or less than one-tenth of the US average.7 
There have, however, been remarkable changes in the 
Japanese venture capital industry in the 2000s. Several IPO 
markets for emerging growth companies were created. 
Deregulation revolutionized the shape of corporate law. The 
legal infrastructure needed to facilitate incentive bargains 
common in the American landscape looks to be in place. Many 
nonprofit organizations (“NPOs”) interested in helping 
entrepreneurs were established around 2000 and have been 
contributing to the creation of venture communities in Japan. 
An infrastructure similar to that of Silicon Valley is fast 
developing and working to promote venture capital investments. 
Yet, Japanese entrepreneurs still do not abandon control to 
venture capitalists. 
Regarding the enigma of the Silicon Valley entrepreneurs’ 
unquestioned abandonment of control to venture capitalists, 
Black and Gilson explain that entrepreneurs, who have 
abandoned control, may be able to regain control if they 
successfully reach an IPO.8 Thomas Hellmann’s explanation is 
that typically, it is economically beneficial for entrepreneurs to 
keep more equity stake by giving control to VCs.9 Why these 
arguments do not explain the current Japanese situation is still 
an enigma. 
Silicon Valley VCs usually obtain control by using the four 
complementary methods: viz., obtaining stock majority; 
                                                                                                                
6. See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text; Zenichi Shishido, The Law and 
Practice of the Venture Industry in Japan: A Period of Transition, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM: AN ERA OF TRANSITION 193, 194 (Tom Ginsburg & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 
2012). 
7. See infra note 79. 
8. Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 243. 
9. See Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 
29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998). 
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obtaining board majority; staged financing; and entering into 
agreements.10 
Japanese entrepreneurs do not abandon stock majority for 
two reasons. First, they typically do not require or believe they 
do not require an amount of capital that would necessitate the 
issuance of an amount capital stock that would cause them to 
end up with a minority share. Second, the cost of losing stock 
majority is higher than in Silicon Valley because: Japanese 
corporate law is based on the shareholder choice doctrine; 
reputational markets are not mature enough for entrepreneurs 
to trust venture capitalists; and entrepreneurs cannot earn sweat 
equity in trade for abandoning stock majority.11 There is a 
strong belief that there is little benefit to Japanese 
entrepreneurs that give up the right to control their companies 
to VCs. 
On the other hand, there are two main reasons why 
Japanese VCs are not as eager as their Silicon Valley 
counterparts to obtain board majority within venture capital 
start-ups. First, gaining board control is much less beneficial to 
Japanese VCs than to Silicon Valley VCs because of legal 
impediments under Japanese corporate law. The “Shareholder 
Choice Doctrine” gives shareholders of Japanese corporations 
much more control, a role played by the board under US 
corporate law. Second, the costs of sending directors to a 
start-up are higher in Japan than in the United States. This is 
due to the corporate law differences between the two countries; 
the Japanese corporate law statute dictating a high level of 
director liability to creditors makes it a much riskier prospect to 
be a board member in Japan.12 
Japanese VCs gain less informal control through staged 
financing than their counterparts in Silicon Valley because they 
do not always plan to continue investing in the start-up over 
different rounds. This can also be explained by that fact that 
                                                                                                                
10. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the 
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 
(2003). 
11. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text. 
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syndicate financing13 is not a standard in the Japanese market. 
A general review of the situation brings to light several corporate 
governance problems for Japanese VC funds as the reasons for 
such practices.14 
Although not much formal control is desired by Japanese 
VCs, some informal control is acquired by entering into stock 
buy-back agreements with the entrepreneurs. This mimics the 
corporate lending practices engaged in by the so-called “main 
banks” that dominate the Japanese market. Such a unique 
contractual arrangement makes it difficult for venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs to trust each other.15 Essentially this gives 
entrepreneurs a reason to believe that the VC is not fully 
invested in their company, while simultaneously giving the VC 
little incentive to help manage the venture. 
Several of Japan’s institutional infrastructures, such as the 
capital markets, reputational markets, and the legal system, 
complementarily affect the incentive bargain between 
entrepreneurs and VCs. Those institutional infrastructures in 
Japan have, for the most part, now caught up with their US 
counterparts. Yet, they fail to provide conditions sufficient to 
entice entrepreneurs to either abandon control or push VCs to 
desire control over the board. These key differences are why the 
venture capital start-up world is still very different in Japan. 
In Part I, this Article focuses on the 2000s, during which 
rapid changes to the institutional infrastructures occurred that 
affect venture capital investments in Japan. Part II points out 
that even in Silicon Valley, entrepreneurs abandoning control to 
VCs is not a matter of course, and further reviews the different 
explanations given by Black and Gilson, and Hellmann. In Part 
III, the reason why control is so important from the point of the 
two-sided agency problem is expounded upon. Part IV reviews 
why Japanese VCs cannot gain enough control to resolve the 
two-sided agency problem, considering the four common 
methods used by VCs to gain control. Part V will conclude with a 
few words on the issues faced by those in the Japanese venture 
start-up community. 
                                                                                                                
13. In syndicate financing, a lead venture capitalist (“VC”) heads the group of 
VCs participating in the same round, under the same contract. 
14. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
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I. CHANGES IN THE JAPANESE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
Although there have been numerous, substantial changes 
in the Japanese venture capital industry over the last decade, the 
changes have not been able to mimic the environment found in 
Silicon Valley. The biggest difference that remains between the 
two countries is the adherence to a system where Japanese 
entrepreneurs’ maintain control even after VCs have input their 
maximum capital investment.16 
Focusing on the venture capital industry, there have been 
three major changes in Japan. First, multiple IPO markets for 
emerging growth companies were created; second, substantial 
amendments to the corporate law were made; and, third, 
venture communities have been gradually developing. 
A. IPO Markets 
After the deregulation of the financial and capital markets 
in 1996 (the “Japanese Big Bang”), several IPO markets were 
launched. 17  The Tokyo Stock Exchange created the 
“MOTHERS” market in November 1999 and subsequently, the 
NASDAQ-Japan market opened its doors in May 2000. 
NASDAQ-Japan was then absorbed by the Osaka Stock 
Exchange and renamed “Hercules” in December 2002, after 
NASDAQ decided to leave the Japanese market. The former 
over-the-counter stock market was reorganized into the JASDAQ 
Securities Exchange in December 2004. Most recently, the 
JASDAQ market and Hercules market merged into a singular 
JASDAQ market in 2010. Japan Exchange Group was established 
                                                                                                                
16. Actually, not only in the venture capital industry but also in corporate 
governance of large publicly held corporations, 1997 was a turnaround year in Japan. 
See Zenichi Shishido, The Turnaround of 1997: Changes in Japanese Corporate Law and 
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 310 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1997). Since then, the legal 
system and Japanese corporate governance practices have changed significantly. This is 
also true when considering publicly held corporations; an important characteristic of 
Japanese corporate governance is management’s adherence to control. For more on 
Japanese venture capital and corporate governance before 1997, see Milhaupt, supra 
note 3. 
17. See Sadakazu Osaki, Innovation and the Regulation of the Capital Markets in 
Japan (Oct. 30–Nov. 1, 2008) (unpublished working paper) (on file with Colmubia 
University School of Law). 
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as a result of the business combination between the Tokyo and 
Osaka stock exchanges in January 2013. In July of the same year, 
the Japan Exchange Group moved the JASDAQ market to the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange as part of the above integration of stock 
exchanges. 
Now, there are several IPO markets for emerging growth 
companies in Japan, which are competing against each other for 
new public listings.18 Unfortunately, several immature venture 
companies went public, tainting the reputation of Japan’s 
fledgling IPO markets.19 This may have also played a role in 
slowing the growth of the newly emerging venture capital 
industry. 
B. Corporate Law Amendments 
Japanese corporate law has been deregulated rapidly in the 
2000s as well. Although these corporate law reforms covered a 
very wide subject area, 20  the following four points are 
particularly significant for venture capital investments. 
1. Stock Options 
Stock options were first introduced to Japan in 1997. Before 
this introduction, Japanese start-up companies were not able to 
use stock options as a method for giving human capital 
providers equity incentives. A famous venture capitalist in 
Silicon Valley, who once had attempted to enter the Japanese 
market and eventually abandoned the idea after a thorough 
investigation of the investment environment in Japan, pointed 
                                                                                                                
18 . Mothers: Criteria for Listing (Mothers), TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, http://
www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/listcriteria/index_mo.html (last visited May 16, 2014); 
JASDAQ: Criteria for Listing (JASDAQ), TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.tse.or.jp/
english/rules/listcriteria/index_jq.html (last visited May 16, 2014); Centrex: NAGOYA 
STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.nse.or.jp/system/centrex/ (last visited May 16, 2014); 
Ambitious: SAPPORO SECURITIES EXCHANGE, http://www.sse.or.jp/sinki/ambi.html 
(last visited May 16, 2014); Q-Board: FUKUOKA STOCK EXCHANGE, http://
www.fse.or.jp/index.html (last visited May 16, 2014); TOKYO PRO Market: TOKYO 
STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/promarket/ (last visited May 
16, 2014). 
19. See Osaki, supra note 17, at 9; Ministry of Econ., Trade, & Indus. [METI], 
Study Group for the Creation and Development of Start-ups Final Report 73 (Apr. 30, 
2008), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/Startups_Finalreport.pdf. 
20. See Shishido, supra note 16, at 313. 
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out deficiencies in the corporate law—particularly the lack of 
stock options. 21  Although stock options were originally 
restricted to very limited use, they were totally deregulated in 
2001.22 Now, stock options are widely used for many purposes, 
including a way to give equity incentives to human capital 
providers of start-up companies. 
2. Preferred Stock 
Japanese corporate law had been quite loyal to the 
one-share-one-vote rule and the equal treatment of all 
shareholders. Consequently, issuing different types of stock 
other than common stock, particularly, no-voting stock and 
multiple-voting stock, had been strongly restricted.23 
Although such a legislative policy might be reasonable for 
keeping good corporate governance of publicly held 
corporations,24 it turned to be an obstacle to venture capital 
investments in Japan. In Silicon Valley, incentive bargains 
between entrepreneurs and VCs are made separately on sharing 
of cash-flow rights and sharing of control, based on freedom of 
the parties to agree to almost any form of preferred stock.25 
In 2000 and 2001, Japanese corporate law was deregulated 
so that using preferred stock became more flexible, like US 
preferred stock. Now entrepreneurs and VCs can use nearly the 
same type of convertible preferred stock as is used in Silicon 
Valley, including veto rights and class voting. Although the 
number of cases involving venture financing through issuance of 
preferred stock has increased, particularly in cash-demanding 
industries such as telecommunication, biotechnology, and 
semiconducting, preferred stock has not yet been widely used 
within the Japanese VC investment world (see TABLE 1).26 
                                                                                                                
21. Interview with Steve Domenik, Partner, Sevin Rosen Funds, Tokyo, Japan 
(Nov. 7, 2000). 
22. See Shishido, supra note 16, at 315. 
23. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of 
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 198 (2000). 
24. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
25. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 281. 
26. See HIROKAZU HASEGAWA, BENCHA KYAPITARISUTO NO JITSUMU [THE PRACTICE 
OF VENTURE CAPITALISTS] 64 (2007); Tatsuhiro Takahara, Torishimariyaku no 
Sennin-kengen no Bunpai to Torishimariyaku no Sekinin [Sharing Board Seats and Liability of 
Directors], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF 




TABLE 1: VC’s Use of Preferred and Common Stock 
  




























It should also be pointed out that the limited use of 
preferred stock may be the reason for many “living-dead 
companies” in Japan, which are not bankrupt but have no hope 
of reaching an IPO. Usually, the VCs have no liquidation 
preference and thus no incentive to dissolve such companies, 
instead letting them stagnate.27 
3. Limiting Director Liability 
The 2001 corporate law reform allowed companies to put 
an upper limit on damages for negligent directors. 28  The 
amendment was a reaction to the prior reforms in the previous 
decade. The corporate law reform of 1993 had fixed the filing 
fee for shareholder derivative actions, resulting in an apparent 
                                                                                                                
VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN] 414 (Zenichi Shishido & Venture Law Forum eds., 
2010). The Data in Table 1 is from HASEGAWA, supra, at 81. 
27. See Allen Miner & Kosuke Sato, Bencha Kigyo Ikusei no tame no Seitaikei [Venture 
Habitat], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE 
COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 130. 
28. Kaisha-ho [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 425, 426, 427 (Japan) 
[hereinafter Companies Act], translated at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/
English%20translation%20of%20Companies%20Act.pdf. 
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increase in the number of such lawsuits.29 Prior to the 2001 
reform, some court decisions had ordered a number of 
negligent company directors to pay extensive amounts in 
damages.30 The business sector lobbied seriously for some cap 
on the amount of director liability for damages incurred by 
negligent conduct.31 
The cap on damages cannot be agreed to ex ante for 
non-outside (executive) directors, but can be allowed ex post 
either by a two-thirds vote of a shareholder meeting or by 
agreement of the board of directors if so provided in the 
charter.32 A significant portion of the 2001 amendment was the 
new ability to cap potential liability for outside directors.33 
Outside directors can make an agreement with their company, 
ex ante, on the appropriate cap on the amount of damages, 
potentially up to two years of their compensation from the 
company.34 This change should have made it less risky, and, 
thus, more likely for VCs to send board members to their 
portfolio companies. As discussed in more detail later, however, 
it is still not standard for Japanese VCs to send directors; instead, 
at most they choose to send observers.35  
                                                                                                                
29. See Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 672 (2001); see also Mark 
West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (2001). 
30. See, e.g., In re Daiwa Bank, 1721 HANREI JIHO 3 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Sept. 20, 
1999); Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 11 (2003). Without finding any conflicts of interest, a large amount of damages 
were ordered to individual directors for their negligence in monitoring. This case 
shocked the business world, just as the Caremark case, In re Caremark International 
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), had in the United States. 
31. See Shishido, supra note 16, at 319. 
32. See Companies Act, supra note 28, arts. 425, 426. 
33 . Japanese corporate law requires outside directors to have never been 
employees or executive directors of the company, but does not require other 
independency. See Companies Act art. 2(xv). Therefore, it should be noted that the 
meaning of “outside director” is not the same as “independent director” in the United 
States. The requirements for outside directors are, however, planned to be revised to 
be closer to US requirements in 2014. 
34. See Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 427. 
35. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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4. Freedom of Contract (Articles of Incorporation) 
Besides the specific parts of the corporate law changes 
mentioned above, deregulation of corporate law as a whole was 
and will continue to be very significant for the practice of 
venture capital investments. Japanese corporate law used to be 
considered mandatory law (over-riding contractual agreements 
in contravention of such law), even in regards to corporate 
governance matters. Over the last decade, the ideology behind 
the term ‘freedom of contract,’ or the free planning of most 
governance issues through specification in the articles of 
incorporation, has gained considerable ground in legal basis. In 
the corporate law reformation of 2005, the principle of freedom 
of contract was formally acknowledged and established.36 Now, 
at least in closely held corporations, which include start-up 
companies, Japanese shareholders can plan their 
inter-relationships as freely as their counterparts in the United 
States.37 
C. Venture Communities 
A bilingual lawyer, with experience practicing both in 
Silicon Valley and in Tokyo, observes: “[I]n 1997, the venture 
community in Japan had not yet achieved any critical mass. 
There were a handful of entrepreneurs and start-up companies, 
and perhaps even fewer venture capitalists, but an infrastructure 
to assist these companies did not yet exist.”38 It does seem that 
                                                                                                                
36. See Zenichi Shishido, Teikan-Jichi no Hani no Kakudai to Meikakuka: Kabunushi 
no Sentaku [Expansion and Clarification of Area of Free Planning by Charters: Shareholders’ 
Choice], 1775 SHOJI HOMU [COM. L. REV.] 17 (2006). Kenjiro Egashira, chairman of the 
legislative commission (Hoseishingikai) at the time of the 2005 corporate law 
reformation, recalls that one of the major subjects of the reformation was to stimulate 
the venture industry. See Kenjiro Egashira, Kaisha-ho Seitei no Rinen to Kaishahosei 
Minaoshi no Yukue [The Philosophy of Legislating the Companies Act and the Direction of 
Ongoing Revision of Corporate Law] 1414 JURIST 95 (2011). 
37. Introduction of the limited liability company (“LLC”) in Japan in 2005 
represented the liberalization of the freedom of contract under the legal framework. 
The Japanese LLC allows for almost perfect freedom of contract. See Shishido, supra 
note 36, at 23. 
38. John Sasaki, Shirikonbare niokeru Yusenkabushiki Keiyaku no Hensen [Historical 
Changes in Preferred Stock Contracts in Silicon Valley], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU 
SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 296.  
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venture communities have seen gradual development over the 
last ten years in Japan.39 
Several non-profit organizations have played an important 
role in organizing venture communities. In 2000, Nippon 
Angels Forum40 was first organized. In 2001, Business Veterans 
Group41 and Venture Law Forum42 followed suit by starting 
their own venture partnerships. Then, in 2002, Japan Venture 
Capital Association43 was launched. Those NPOs have set up an 
infrastructure to provide entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and 
other professionals with opportunities to exchange information 
and expand their professional networks. 
Professionals, such as venture capitalists, lawyers, and 
accountants that are specialized for start-up companies, have 
been gradually increasing and provide an infrastructure to assist 
these companies. There has also been growth in expatriate 
entrepreneurship with VC funding in Japan.44 
In addition to venture capital firms, there is growing 
participation in early-stage investments by angel investors— 
wealthy individuals who provide seed capital to new ventures. In 
his 1997 article, Professor Milhaupt pointed out that there were 
no angel investors in Japan.45 By 2008, however, there were 
more than ten angel networks in Japan,46 comprised of roughly 
360 investors.47 It is likely that the number has continued to 
                                                                                                                
39. For more on the venture community in Silicon Valley, see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, 
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 
(1994). 
40. See NIPPON ANGELS FORUM, Nippon Angels Forum (Pamphlet) (Apr. 1, 2004) 
(in Japanese) (on file with author). 
41. See BUS. VETERANS GROUP, http://www.veteran.jp (last visited May 16, 2014). 
42. Venture Law Forum (“VLF”) is a non-profit organization, which the Author 
has organized with practicing lawyers, accountants, venture capitalists, capital markets 
specialists, journalists, and academics. The main purpose of the forum is to gather 
information on Japan’s venture industry. 
43. See JAPAN VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, http://www.jvca.jp (last visited May 16, 
2014). 
44. See, for example, J-Seed Ventures Inc., a small venture-themed company in 
Tokyo that supports both Japanese and non-Japanese entrepreneurs in establishing 
start-up companies with venture capital derived from both domestic and international 
sources. For more information on the type of start-up companies in this sub-community 
of the Japanese venture capital industry visit www.j-seed.com. 
45. See Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 877. 
46. See METI, supra note 19, at 53. 
47. See ROBERT KNELLER, BRIDGING ISLANDS 169, 183 (2009). 
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increase over the last three years. While the angel community 
remains comparatively small, with investment amounts that are 
far lower than those invested in the United States, it has been 
vital to the financing of certain biotechnology start-up 
companies.48 
There is no doubt that the current situation of Japan’s 
venture industry in 2014 is totally different from the situation in 
1997. Yet, the development of a true venture community is still 
distant and the industry has not matured enough to provide a 
good reputational market to help decrease the risk to 
entrepreneurs and improve the role of the VCs in Japan.49 
II. WHY DO ENTREPRENEURS ABANDON CONTROL TO 
VENTURE CAPITALISTS IN SILICON VALLEY? 
Even in the United States, entrepreneurs occasionally 
attempt to keep control from falling into participating VCs’ 
hands. Fifteen years ago, there were serious debates on why 
entrepreneurs often abandoned their control, particularly in the 
Silicon Valley model. It is clear that US VCs usually obtain some 
rights of control. This is costly to the founder/entrepreneur 
because the VC may have the legal authority to displace the 
founder from the CEO position at any time.50 Why does the 
founder transfer control rights to VCs when it makes her so 
vulnerable? A number of possible explanations have surfaced. 
A. Black & Gilson 
Black and Gilson pointed out that the use of convertible 
preferred stock and the existence of liquid IPO markets create 
the “call option of control” for entrepreneurs. 
Their explanation is that an implicit component of a 
venture capital financing contract is an option on control given 
to the founder. This right to reacquire control is realized upon 
(i) a conversion of the venture capitalist’s preferred stock to 
common stock, which forces the venture capitalist to give up all 
                                                                                                                
48. See id. at 169, 182. 
49. See infra notes 115–126 and accompanying text. 
50. The founder has the risk of his managerial quasi-rents being expropriated. See 
Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Financing, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 256 
(1994); see also Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 258. 
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contractual control rights, (ii) an exit by the venture capitalist 
through liquidating her stake in a public offering, or (iii) a 
dilution of the venture capitalist’s stake below a point where she 
exercises any meaningful control.51  Given that both parties 
usually share the common goal of participating in a lucrative 
public offering, founders are typically given a powerful and 
heavily leveraged financial incentive to bring about this result. 
This incentive may be strong enough to outweigh the potential 
risk of losing the position at the helm of the venture company 
the entrepreneur/CEO founded. 
B. Hellmann 
Hellmann simply explains that entrepreneurs abandon 
their control to VCs because entrepreneurs can keep more 
equity than otherwise by doing so. 
This explanation presumes that the founder can retain a 
significantly larger portion of equity when the choice to give up 
control is made. The venture capitalist permits the retention of 
a larger equity stake because it produces a two-fold benefit. First, 
the venture capitalist has an incentive to invest in finding 
superior management teams (to replace the founder if needed). 
Second, founders with a highly leveraged financial interest in 
the success of the venture company have sufficient financial 
incentive to give up control, even where they lose the private 
benefits associated with control.52 
C. Why Not in Japan? 
Both the explanation given by Black and Gilson and that of 
Hellmann sound persuasive. Because of the above-described 
changes to Japanese corporate law and the maturing of the 
venture community, both explanations could also be true in 
Japan now, but the reality is that Japanese entrepreneurs still 
choose not to abandon control to VCs. 
When Black and Gilson published their Article fifteen years 
ago, there were no liquid IPO markets and the Silicon Valley 
                                                                                                                
51. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 260. As Black & Gilson explain, “the 
prospect of an IPO exit gives the entrepreneur something of a call option on control, 
contingent on the firm’s success.” Id. at 261. 
52. See Hellmann, supra note 9, at 57. 
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type of convertible preferred stock was not yet available. Now, 
Japanese entrepreneurs and VCs are able to take advantage of 
several liquid IPO markets 53  and engage in freely-planned 
convertible preferred stock agreements. 54  Thus, Black and 
Gilson’s argument that the call option for entrepreneurs could 
not work in Japan because of the lack of a liquid IPO market 
and convertible preferred stock is not sufficient to explain the 
current Japanese situation. 
Hellmann’s explanation should also apply to Japan under 
the current legal system, and even as it existed fifteen years ago. 
By gaining control, Japanese VCs could also decrease their risk 
and thus allow entrepreneurs to keep more equity than would 
be the case otherwise. Accordingly, it should be beneficial to 
entrepreneurs as well. 
It is clear that both explanations fail to account for the 
situation that exists in Japan. 
III. WHY IS CONTROL IMPORTANT? 
Before discussing the differences between Japanese venture 
capital investments and Silicon Valley practices, it is necessary to 
understand the importance of the role that control plays in 
venture capital investments throughout most countries. 
A. The Two-sided Agency Problem and Control Sharing 
Control is vital to any venture capital deal because of the 
existence of a typical two-sided agency problem.55 If VCs feel too 
much risk, they will hesitate to invest their monetary capital. On 
the other side, if entrepreneurs feel too much risk, they will 
hesitate to invest their human capital. For maximizing their own 
payoff, both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs need to 
reduce not only their own risk, but also that of their 
counterparts, by bargaining for agreements specifying specific 
control- and value-sharing commitments.56 
                                                                                                                
53. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
54. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
55. See generally, Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral 
Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts, 26 RAND J. ECON. 761 (1995). 
56. See infra Appendix. 
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1. What Types of Risk Do VCs Feel? 
One thing that many VCs fear off the bat is that 
entrepreneurs may lack management capability. Even though an 
entrepreneur may be an excellent engineer, in most cases, he 
has little business experience and is unable to manage the firm 
after it grows beyond a certain size.57 In that case, VCs would 
usually try to replace the founder CEO with a professional 
manager more accustomed to handling a larger-sized 
company.58 If VCs have no control then the entrepreneur will 
be able to retain the CEO position, causing a situation in which 
the firm’s value may stagnate, or even decrease. If the CEO is 
uncooperative, it may lead to a disaster for all parties involved. 
Another issue for VCs is how to inhibit entrepreneurs from 
pursuing private benefits, such as a high salary or luxury perks.59 
For example, if VCs have no control, they cannot stop the 
entrepreneur from leasing an unaffordable office space or 
otherwise wasting capital meant for the betterment of the 
venture on obtaining the trappings of personal wealth and 
power. 
Thirdly, and related to the second issue, is that 
entrepreneurs may seek continuation of the venture even if the 
correct business decision is to shut down.60 Likewise, a venture 
business may turn into a “plaything” for some entrepreneurs. If 
VCs have no control, they can do little to nothing to remedy 
issues such as this, presenting a source of unnecessary costs via 
risk. 
Fourth, entrepreneurs may exit at unfavorable timing for 
VCs. For some start-up companies, their only valuable asset may 
be the talent of the entrepreneur and her management team. 
Without them, the firm is valueless. The entrepreneur may 
decide to leave the firm after VCs have already invested money 
but before the investments have produced any return. Actually, 
VCs cannot avoid this type of risk even through gaining control. 
                                                                                                                
57. See Jesse Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 NYU L. REV. 967, 989 (2006). 
58. See Hellmann, supra note 9, at 58. 
59. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 989. 
60. See id. 
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Instead, they try to avoid this risk by use of contractual schemes, 
such as vesting requirements61 and “drag along” rights.62 
One other important issue often faced by VCs is where an 
entrepreneur rejects an IPO proposition or mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&A”) deal that would benefit the VC. It is 
understandable that entrepreneurs are often against selling off 
their firms, in many cases to competitors. This is either due to 
the entrepreneurs’ sentimental attachment, or because of 
deemed liquidation clauses that prove unfavorable to 
entrepreneurs.63 Notwithstanding this hesitancy, an M&A deal is 
an important exit strategy for VCs if an IPO is not achievable. It 
is also not surprising that when entrepreneurs are against an 
IPO, it is because they may dislike the cost of disclosure or the 
risk of possible hostile takeovers after the IPO takes place.64 
Despite these potential conflicts, the IPO remains the dominant 
exit strategy for Japanese VCs both in number and in 
profitability. IPOs accounted for 44.9% of VC exits, while M&A 
deals or resale of control to entrepreneurs were the next most 
popular methods—with roughly equivalent showings of 16.3% 
and 13.2%, respectively.65 
VCs have the ability to reduce or eliminate most of these 
risks by gaining control. Only the fourth issue, related to early 
withdrawal by the entrepreneur, cannot be resolved through VC 
control.  
                                                                                                                
61. See MICHAEL HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING 
NEGOTIATION 6-18, 13-1 (3d ed. 2000). 
62. See id., at 6-18. 
63. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. As a typical case of conflict of 
interests derived from deemed liquidation clauses, see in re Trados Incorporated 
Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 1512-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013). 
64. As a recent phenomenon, disclosure regulations in the United States and 
Japan nicknamed SOX and J-SOX have substantially increased the cost of reaching 
Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) and being listed. See Zenichi Shishido & Sadakazu 
Osaki, Reverse Engineering SOX versus J-SOX: A Lesson in Legislative Policy, in ENTERPRISE 
LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN, supra note 5. 
65. Venture Enter. Ctr., Survey on Current Status of Investment of Venture Capitals and 
Other Funds (Jan. 2010), http://www.vec.or.jp/wordpress/wp-content/files/survey
-21j-5.pdf; see also METI, supra note 19, at 90. However, because of the troubled 
economic market, IPOs accounted for just 9.9% in fiscal year 2008. See Venture Enter. 
Ctr., supra. 
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 2. What Types of Risk Do Entrepreneurs Feel? 
It is now important to ask what are the real and perceived 
risks that an entrepreneur experiences vis-à-vis VCs? 
First, VCs may behave opportunistically because they are 
often concerned with only monetary value of a portfolio 
company. For example, VCs may attempt to squeeze out 
entrepreneurs or other existing shareholders; VCs may value the 
company unfavorably for entrepreneurs and other existing 
shareholders when subsequent rounds of capital are raised; and 
VCs may also act to benefit their class at the expense of other 
shareholders as a group, especially when they own preferred 
stock with special rights.66 
Second, VCs may exit at unfavorable timing for 
entrepreneurs. Particularly, venture capitalists tend to choose 
immediate liquidation events if it appears to present the greatest 
potential for profit or loss mitigation.67 
Entrepreneurs can reduce these risks if they are able to 
maintain control post venture financing. 
B. Sharing Cash-Flow Rights and Sweat Equity 
Bargaining for cash-flow rights can be complementary to 
the control sharing agreements.68 Typical schemes in Silicon 
Valley involve sweat equity—the profit earned by the 
entrepreneurs and founding employees when a common stock 
matures. 
Usually, the first transaction between the entrepreneur and 
the VC is a second stage financing. The first stage is typically a 
smaller infusion of seed capital, perhaps a “friends & family” or 
“angel” round. When the VC enters the scene, it invests in a 
company with some business history, and the company issues 
new stock to the venture capitalist—typically preferred stock that 
is convertible into common stock.69  The preferred stock is 
issued, for example, at a price of US$2.00 per share to the 
                                                                                                                
66. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. As a typical example of opportunistic 
behavior by VCs, see Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Technologies, Inc., 2013 WL 1104901 
(Del. Ch., Mar. 15, 2013). 
67. See id. at 994. 
68. See infra Appendix. 
69. HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 6-11. 
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venture capitalist, while the price of the common stock issued to 
the founder was US$0.10 six months earlier.70 Suppose the 
preferred stock provides for (1) non-cumulative dividends, (2) a 
liquidation preference equal to the original issue price, 
(3) mandatory redemption, (4) voting rights equivalent to those 
of the common stock, (5) convertibility into one share of 
common stock, (6) anti-dilution protection, and (7) automatic 
conversion into common stock upon a public offering.71 These 
terms are fairly typical of a second-round investment. They also 
reflect fascinating and complex incentives. To reiterate how 
useful it is to examine contractual organizations with respect to 
the contracting parties, these terms illustrate that the venture 
capitalist has pre-chosen its remedy for bad outcomes—a 
liquidation preference—as well as set up its control and 
participation rights for good outcomes. 
A feature that underlies the incentive bargain is that, in 
allocating equity the parties exchange the financial capital 
contribution of the venture capitalist for the human-capital 
contributions of the founder. Because preferred stock is 
automatically converted into common stock upon a public 
offering, the common stock and the preferred stock have 
comparable value if the venture is a success. In other words, the 
preferred stock’s seniority disappears if the venture is successful, 
as measured by the ability to consummate a public offering. 
One of the reasons why VCs in Silicon Valley invest through 
preferred stock is for tax reasons.72 The argument is that the 
common stock acquired by the entrepreneurs, and the 
preferred stock acquired by the VCs, are wholly different stock, 
so their price difference is reasonable. The value of the common 
stock builds over time with the efforts expended by the 
entrepreneur input to reach a profitable exit. 
As a result, entrepreneurs and managers of start-up 
companies can avoid current taxation and enjoy tax deferral and 
reduced tax rates under capital gains rules. It has been an 
established IRS practice not to challenge most sweat equity 
                                                                                                                
70. Id. at 6-12. 
71. Id. at 6-11. 
72. See Ronald Gilson & David Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A 
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 889 (2003). 
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schemes,73  although the climate looks to be changing and 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regulations under Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 409A, which became effective as 
of January 1, 2009, point toward a less lenient taxation trend.74 
IV. WAYS THAT VENTURE CAPITALISTS GAIN CONTROL 
In Silicon Valley, the two sided agency problem is resolved 
by making entrepreneurs abandon control to VCs.75 
Methods by which control is captured by VCs can be 
divided into formal ways of gaining control and indirect ways of 
gaining control. Formal methods require either obtaining stock 
majority or obtaining board majority. The indirect methods 
incorporate either through staged financing or specific 
agreement (monitoring contracts).76 
A. Control via Stock Acquisition 
First and foremost, VCs obtain control by gaining a stock 
majority in the venture capital industry at large. This, however, is 
not the case in Japan. Although the equity ratio of VCs has 
gradually increased, the average ratio at IPO in 2008 was still 
17.50%. 77  As mentioned previously, Japanese entrepreneurs 
keep stock majority even after IPO in many cases (see TABLE 2).78 
                                                                                                                
73. The US Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) loosely follows what is casually 
known as the 10-to-1 rule. It is not a written rule but a tax practice, to which venture 
communities in the United States are accustomed. See id. at 892, 900; JOSEPH W. 
BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS AND 
REORGANIZATIONS 82–83 (2d ed. 1995). 
74. Under the final regulation IRC 409A, the standard for fair market value will be 
stricter, often requiring a third party valuation. However, many practitioners predict 
that the “10-to-1” rule might still be effective—at least for an early stage start-up 
company as long as the board determines “in good faith” that the preferred stock is 
worth ten times the value of the common stock. See Zenichi Shishido, Sweat Equity as a 
Gift (Sho Sato Conference at UC Berkeley Law School) (unpublished working paper, 
2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/8364.htm. 
75. In Silicon Valley, the reputational market plays an important role for filling 
the risk gap faced by entrepreneurs who abandon control to venture capitalists. 
76. See infra Appendix. 
77. Hirokazu Hasegawa, Bencha Kigyo no Genjo [The Current Situation of Venture 
Companies], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF 
VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 49, 54. 
78. Takahiro Takahara, 51% Mondai [51% Problem], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU 
ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, 
at 420, 421; Shishido, supra note 6, at 197. Data by PRONEXUS. 
1108 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1087 
 
TABLE 2: Founder Family Shareholding at IPO (average) 









































1. Reasons Behind an Entrepreneur’s Ability to Maintain Stock 
Majority in Japan 
In Silicon Valley, entrepreneurs are usually forced to 
abandon control of their venture capital financers because they 
require an amount of money that can only be provided by 
risk-taking VCs. Japanese entrepreneurs keep stock majority 
because they seek to raise relatively small amounts of money 
from VCs. In fact, Japanese VCs invest less than JPY¥100 million 
in a venture start-up company on average, which is less than 
one-tenth of the US average.79 
There are three hypotheses that are used to explain why 
Japanese entrepreneurs raise smaller amounts of money from 
VCs. 
One hypothesis is that Japanese entrepreneurs do not 
perceive a need to raise a large amount of capital. Most Japanese 
start-up companies are either in the software industry or in the 
service industry, which are not considered cash demanding 
                                                                                                                
 
79. See METI, supra note 19, at 61. 
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industries.80 This is supported by the fact that even Japanese 
entrepreneurs are forced to abandon control in the 
biotech/pharmaceutical industry, which requires huge amounts 
of financing to reach a favorable result (see TABLE 3).81  
 
                                                                                                                
80. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 60. 
81. See KNELLER, supra note 47, at 170. Japanese entrepreneurs rely on both 
government funding and private venture capital to finance technology ventures. 
Government funding accounts for about 20% of average R&D expenses, but comprises 
a significantly higher proportion among firms that receive government grants. The 
liberalization of listing requirements for Japanese equity markets in the late 1990s 
enabled entrepreneurs to decrease their reliance on government funding and raise 
pre-IPO equity capital from Japanese VCs. See id. Data in TABLE 3 from Japan Venture 
Research Monthly Report, January 2009, at 6. 
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TABLE 3: VC Investment and IPO Pricing by Sector (all amounts 













Telecom  419 89 287 3,544 
Services  280 72 227 3,143 
Pharma. 2,989 2,690 623 5,282 
All 
companies 




















Telecom  1,799 25.17 3 14.28 7 
Services  2,277 14.33 1 5.32 23 
Pharma. 6,372 - 2.31 21 55.79 11 
All 
companies 
2,796 12 2 11 17 
 
Some VCs point out that Japanese entrepreneurs generally 
have small dreams in comparison to their US counterparts. 
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While US entrepreneurs try to dominate world markets as soon 
as possible, Japanese entrepreneurs tend to aim only for the 
domestic market.82 Many would attribute this difference to the 
different atmospheres of risk and its acceptability in the United 
States compared to Japan. 
The second hypothesis is that individual Japanese venture 
capitalists are risk averse to a point, stifling their ability to match 
American VC investment standards. Most of them are “salary 
men” of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and 
manufacturing companies without much experience or appetite 
for truly risky ventures. Additionally, they lack an equity 
incentive to invest in most cases. It is economically reasonable 
for them to not invest a large amount of money in a single 
company; instead, they prefer making a wide range of portfolio 
investments, as would any investor attempting to mitigate 
potential loss through diversification.83 
The third and final hypothesis is that debt financing can be 
complementary for Japanese start-up companies, including 
government loans. In the Japanese capital market, debt 
financing plays a major role, especially for venture financing in 
its early history.84 Still today, the share of debt financing in 
start-up companies in Japan is much higher than it is in the 
United States.85 
2. Reasons for Entrepreneurs’ Adherence to Stock Majority in 
Japan 
Why do Japanese entrepreneurs insist on retaining stock 
majority? 
First, there is a cultural aspect which helps explain the 
situation. Japanese entrepreneurs may not be genuinely 
equity-oriented and they place importance on other issues, 
which are considered “more than money.” The most important 
                                                                                                                
82. See Presentation by Allen Miner (CEO, SunBridge) at Venture Law Forum, 
supra note 42, on September 25, 2007. 
83. See infra notes 115–123 and accompanying text; see also Miner & Sato, supra 
note 27, at 98, 103. 
84. See, e.g., YUICHIRO ITAKURA, SHACHO SHIKKAKU [A FAILED CEO] (1998); see 
also Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 878. 
85. It may be influential that governmental agencies provide start-up loans and 
start-up guarantees in Japan. See HIROKAZU HASEGAWA, BENCHA MANEJIMENTO 
NYUMON [INTRODUCTION TO VENTURE MANAGEMENT] 159 (2010). 
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thing for them is to keep control of their company.86 Such 
behavior looks very much like that of family company owners 
and what is commonly termed “founder’s syndrome.” A 
proposition of Hellmann’s logic is that VCs and entrepreneurs 
share the same goal—to maximize their own return on 
investment. This proposition looks to hold much less sway within 
Japan. 
Second, there is another obstacle applying Hellmann’s 
logic to the Japanese situation. One of Hellmann’s propositions 
is that entrepreneurs have the ability to retain a larger equity 
share as a complement of giving up control. But, Japanese tax 
law is unfriendly to the method of using equity as an incentive. 
Particularly, the Japanese National Tax Agency challenges the 
sweat equity practice as a virtual gift and thus, recipients are 
required to pay gift tax at a prohibitively high rate.87 As a result, 
the sharing of cash-flow rights has not become a complementary 
way to bargain for control sharing. 
Third, influences still remain from the extensively 
bank-centered capital market present in Japan. 88  This is a 
path-dependent factor because the venture capital industry does 
not exist independently and is inevitably influenced by the 
                                                                                                                
86. It turns out that one reason Japanese entrepreneurs have historically resisted 
selling their companies is because of unfavorable tax treatment (vis-à-vis IPOs), as a 
result there is only a limited mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) market in Japan. See 
Michael Korver, Egujitto toshite no M&A [M&A as an Exit], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU 
ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, 
at 465, 466, 473. In other words, the exit strategy for venture capitalists is often limited 
to IPOs. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 111. 
87. There are several possible reasons for such unfriendly tax treatment of sweat 
equity by the Japanese tax agency. See Shishido, supra note 74; Zenichi Shishido, Zeisei 
ga Kigyo-Katsudo no Pureiya no Doukizuke ni Ataeru Eikyo [Influences of Tax on Incentives of 
Players in Firms], in KIGYO TOCHI NO TAYOKA TO TENBO [DIVERSIFICATION OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS FUTURE] 185, 189 (Hideki Kanda ed., 2007); 
Tatsuaki Kitachi, Masahiko Kitazume & Yoshichika Matsushita, Zeimu jou no Ronten [Tax 
Issues], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE 
COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 366, 375. After serious negotiations between the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”) and the National Tax Agency, in 
October 2011, a footnote was included on the website of METI that states, in effect, 
that the exercise of a qualified stock option for common stock could be based on the 
value of the company’s common stock and need not be based on the price of preferred 
stock issued before the stock option. It is a small but significant step toward the 
establishment of the practice of issuing sweat equity in Japan. See Shishido, supra note 6, 
at 201. 
88. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 243; see also Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 897. 
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capital market situation as a whole. In Japan, stock ownership of 
publicly held corporations has been stabilized through 
bank-centered cross shareholding. Black and Gilson presume 
the existence of a Berle and Means world, where management 
maintains control through dispersed stock ownership,89 but that 
proposition is lacking in the Japanese stock market for 
companies after IPO. 
Fourth, the reputational market for VCs has yet to evolve in 
Japan. VCs are not trusted by entrepreneurs and although this 
obstacle has seen improvement over the last ten years, venture 
communities are still not mature. There is no mechanism in 
Japan for filling the risk gaps created for entrepreneurs who 
must make deals with VCs that lack a readily available 
reputation.90 
The competing legal systems also play an important role in 
creating the different attitudes toward stock majority observed 
by entrepreneurs in both countries. Japanese corporate law is 
based on the shareholder choice doctrine, while American 
corporate law is based on the management choice doctrine.91 In 
Japan, shareholder meetings are used as a tool to decide almost 
all issues faced by the company. This includes charter 
amendments, regardless of whether the board of directors 
cooperates.92 In addition to this, there was no class voting 
system in Japan until 2001. Even after preferred stock was 
deregulated and class voting became available, class voting has 
remained rare, even within companies that have issued 
preferred stock.93 That means, in most venture companies in 
                                                                                                                
89. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 243. 
90. For more on the significance of the reputational market, see infra Appendix. 
91. See infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text; see also Shishido, supra note 6, 
at 199. 
92 . Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 295; see also KENJIRO EGASHIRA, 
KABUSHIKI-KAISHA HO [LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS] 296–97 (4th ed. 2011). Under 
Delaware law, only the election of directors and amendment of the bylaws do not 
require board approval before shareholder meetings decide. See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, 
THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 54 (2008). 
93. The infrequent use of class voting is probably due to the strict legal rule which 
abolishes class voting arrangements altogether if shareholders cannot elect the 
required number of directors through a class vote. See Companies Act, supra note 28, 
art. 112; see also Hajime Tanahashi, Shurui-kabushiki no Tsukaikata [Ways of Using Different 
Types of Stocks], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF 
VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 290. 
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Japan, directors can only be elected by the shareholders as a 
whole. Clearly, stock majority plays a very important role, 
enough to have Japanese entrepreneurs insist on maintaining 
stock majority. 
B. Control via Board 
The second way VCs can obtain control is by gaining a 
board majority.94 Again, this is not the case in Japan. Japanese 
VCs almost never gain or even attempt to gain board control. In 
many instances they agree to have no board seat at all, 
preferring instead to send observers to the board.95 Observation 
rights allow the VCs to keep an eye on the workings of the board 
while maintaining a liability buffer. They can also be used to 
help VCs make determinations on whether or not to make use 
of a “stock buy-back” clause imbedded in the venture 
agreement.96 
Simply put, Japanese VCs make conscious decisions not to 
control a company’s board because the perceived benefit does 
not outweigh the perceived liability of directorship in Japan. 
The modern Japanese legal system is ambiguous in regards to 
negligent directors. Some courts have found liability to 
third-parties (i.e. creditors) for negligence of supervision at a 
bar far lower than that seen in the United States.97 
1. Smaller Benefit 
As pointed out, board control is less important in Japan 
than in the United States. Shareholder meetings are used in 
Japan, where, board meetings are typically more influential in 
the United States.98 Furthermore, VCs choose to avoid investing 
through preferred stock in most cases.99 Accordingly, the VCs 
                                                                                                                
94. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 290. 
95. See Presentation by Tatsuhiro Takahara (Partner, TMI Law Firm) at Venture 
Law Forum, supra note 42, on April 7, 2008; see also Takahara, supra note 26, at 405, 
406. 
96. See infra note 124–125 and accompanying text. 
97. In re Maruzen Inc., 27-5 MINSHU 655 (Sup. Ct., May 22, 1973). 
98. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 53; Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 
976. 
99. See Hasegawa, supra note 26, at 64. 
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are less worried about bad behavior by common shareholders 
because of the lower risk of conflicts of interest arising.100 
Interestingly, when looking at the role of the board, 
Japanese law is less regulatory than US law. This is merely a 
result of the fact that Japanese law is based on the shareholder 
choice doctrine, whereas US law is based on the management 
choice doctrine.101 
In the United States, several business decisions must be 
made by the board and even amendment to bylaws cannot grant 
the shareholders such decision making powers. The board 
manages the business and affairs of the company, initiates 
charter amendments, and fundamental transactions, such as 
mergers, IPOs and liquidations. Shareholders, on the other 
hand, usually cannot initiate fundamental transactions, even 
when their approval is required to effectuate the transaction.102 
In Japan, shareholder meetings are the tool used to make 
decisions in areas including dividends and executive 
compensation—issues outside of the control of shareholders in 
the United States. Shareholders can even initiate charter 
amendments.103 Not only Japanese but also US corporate law 
allows the shareholders to decide almost everything, as long as 
the charter so provides. It is, however, difficult to imagine a 
venture company which has such provisions in its charter 
because venture companies generally see themselves as future 
public companies. The default rules are hard to deviate from 
and are usually influential to the incentive of the parties. 
This analysis shows a clear difference in the levels of 
importance granted to the board in the two countries. 
2. Higher Costs 
The risk to Japanese VCs does not require board control, 
but is incurred if even a single board member is sent.  
                                                                                                                
100. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 977. 
101 . See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 53; MITSUHIRO FUKAO, FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL 
COMPANIES 4 (1995); Shishido, supra note 23, at 198. 
102. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000(a) (West 
1990); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01 (1984); see Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 
976; Shishido, supra note 6, at 199. 
103. Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 295, 466. 
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There is no significant difference in director liability to the 
company between the two countries under the current legal 
system. Companies can set a cap on liability for outside directors 
through provisions in the articles of incorporation.104 Director 
and Officer (“D&O”) insurance will cover most costs incurred if 
liability is found, unless there is gross negligence. The 
shareholder derivative action systems are not exactly the same 
but are more similar than not.  
There is one important difference when considering 
venture capital directors in particular. The problem is that in 
venture capital backed firms, there are many conflicting interest 
situations among shareholders. Most conspicuous of the 
conflicts are those existing between the entrepreneur and 
venture capitalists. Issues arise when both sides meet to discuss 
and eventually determine important factors including company 
valuation, decision to sell the venture, liquidations, mergers, and 
so on. The question becomes whether venture capital directors 
can use their voice to cast a vote that favors the venture capital 
interest without violating the fiduciary duties attendant to their 
directorship positions within one of their fund’s portfolio firms. 
Japanese written law plainly states that directors have 
fiduciary duties to the company and requires directors elected 
by class-voting to be loyal to the company, not to their electing 
body.105 Some Japanese lawyers may be concerned about the 
possible fiduciary duty violation by their venture capitalist 
clients, who inevitably have conflicting interests, and courts may 
recognize their gross negligence, although there has been no 
such legal case so far.106 
In answer to this problem, Delaware courts once adopted a 
“control-contingent” approach to fiduciary duties. 107  This 
                                                                                                                
104. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
105. Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 355. 
106. See Takahara, supra note 78, at 408; Shishido, supra note 6, at 200. 
107. Fried & Ganor summarized the case law as follows: “[A] common-controlled 
board is free to serve the interests of common shareholders at the expense of the 
preferred shareholders and aggregate shareholder value. In contrast, a 
preferred-controlled board can make business decisions that serve the preferred at the 
expense of common, as long as those decisions can be defended as in the best interests 
of the corporation.” Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. See generally Equity-Linked 
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997); Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Apr. 1, 1997). 
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precedent provides the parties with an additional economic 
incentive to give venture capitalists board control.108 Other than 
for tax reasons, using preferred stock allows venture capitalists 
that invest in Delaware corporations, the ability to mostly avoid 
fiduciary duty litigations even when venture capital directors 
clearly pursue venture capitalist interests. However, it appears 
that recent Delaware cases changed this precedent and the 
situation is now unclear.109 
The bigger difference between US and Japanese law exists 
when considering the potential for liability to third parties, i.e. 
creditors. 
Japanese written law dictates that directors are liable for 
damages to a third-party that are caused as a result of their gross 
negligence in the course of executing their duty to the 
company.110 Actually, there are many cases in which directors 
have been ordered to pay damages of creditors—particularly in 
bankruptcy cases—for reasons including insufficient oversight.111 
There is no such law or precedent in the United States, and only 
in the case of fraud to creditors, will a director face the 
possibility of being held personally liable.112 Because of this 
corporate law statute and its case law, it continues to be a risky 
venture to take on a directorship at a start-up company, which 
generally has a higher risk of bankruptcy and thus potential 
liability claims by third party creditors. 
C. Control via Staged Financing 
Many commentators have pointed out that the most 
significant scheme by which VCs gain substantial control in 
                                                                                                                
108. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. 
109. In re Trados Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 1512-VCL, slip 
op. at 35–36, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013) (denying the control-contingent 
approach in a footnote). 
110. Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 429; see Shishido, supra note 6, at 200. 
111. See EGASHIRA supra note 92, at 469–76. 
112. See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
LAW 236 (3d ed. 2011) (debating over whether directors owe a duty to creditors in the 
case of insolvency or near insolvency); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe 
Communications Corporation, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991) (deciding there is no 
claim by creditors in the zone of insolvency and no direct claim (but a possible 
derivative claim) by creditors in insolvency); see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming 
Fdn., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
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Silicon Valley is through staged financing.113 Japanese VCs use 
this staged financing method far less frequently than in the 
United States, where it is all but omnipresent for successful early 
stage start-ups. 114  From analysis of the table below, two 
characteristics of Japanese venture capital investments can be 
observed (see TABLE 4). 
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52% 3% 4% 12% 29% 
1. Reasons for Less Staged Financing in Japan 
First, the rate of continuous investments over different 
rounds by the same VC is much lower in Japan than in the 
United States. 115  Bank-affiliated VCs and securities 
                                                                                                                
113. See, e.g., PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 171 
(2d ed. 2004). 
114. See Tatsuaki Takahara, Dankaiteki Toshi [Staged Financing], in BENCHA KIGYO 
NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], 
supra note 26, at 422, 424. The Data in TABLE 4 is from HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 81. 
115. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 129; see also KENTA FUNAOKA, SHINKI 
KOKAI-JI NO BENCHA KYAPITARU NO YAKUWARI [THE ROLE OF VENTURE CAPITALS AT 
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firm-affiliated VCs make one-shot portfolio investments in most 
cases, although small numbers of independent venture 
capitalists try to take advantage of staged financing when dealing 
with their hands-on investments. 116  This typical Japanese 
practice gives entrepreneurs little to no incentive to follow the 
potentially beneficial directions of a VC. 
Second, syndicate financing organized by a lead investor is 
not the standard in Japan. Instead, multiple VCs will make 
portfolio investments during the same round, with little 
cooperation or communication between the different VCs (see 
TABLE 4 above). 117  Each VC makes a different investment 
contract with the start-up company. This practice gives 
entrepreneurs substantial bargaining power in the deal because 
they can often make VCs compete against one another. Statistics 
show that more venture capitalists in the same round lead to 
overall lower internal rate of return (“IRR”) in Japan, which is 
opposite the case of the United States.118 
2. The Corporate Governance Problems of Venture Capital 
Funds 
Why do these practices continue in Japan, even where 
shown to be hostile to the venture capital industry? Mainly 
because of the many corporate governance problems evident 
within the venture capital funds themselves. First, most venture 
capitalists have no equity incentive.119 As mentioned previously, 
many of them are “salary-men,” such as bank and insurance 
company employees. Second, most VC fund investors are not 
genuinely equity-oriented. They are generally either the VC 
companies’ parent financial institutions, or business firms, 
which are often their cross-shareholding partner companies. 
                                                                                                                
IPO] 41 (2007). The statistics gathered for this publication show that of the 165 start-up 
companies questioned, 119 appear to have only received one round of venture capital 
backed financing prior to reaching IPO (data gathered from 2000 to 2005). 
116 . Japanese venture capitalists are generally categorized into five groups 
depending on their parent companies: bank/insurance company backed venture 
capitalists, securities firm backed venture capitalists, business company backed venture 
capitalists, government backed venture capitalists, and independent venture capitalists. 
See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 51. 
117. See id. at 65, 105, 132. 
118. See id. at 92. 
119. See id. at 65; Shishido, supra note 6, at 197. 
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They do not care about the financial return of funds as much as 
US Investors to VCs do.120 Moreover, the share of capital being 
invested by pension funds’ is still negligible.121 As a result, low 
IRR funds can and do survive.122 Third, this type of venture 
capitalist has no incentive to follow up with a specific start-up 
company or organize a syndicate with other venture capitalists to 
increase the size of the round. It is safer for them to make many 
portfolio investments to minimize risk and avoid involvement 
with potential competitors. And fourth, the small size of VC 
funds in Japan reinforces this risk-averse portfolio investment 
policy.123 
D. Control via Agreement 
Even Japanese VCs cannot invest money in start-up 
companies without gaining some kind of control. They gain 
some informal control by entering into shareholder agreements 
peculiar to Japan as well as acquiring some type of observation 
rights. 
These shareholder agreements consist of two parts. The 
first part consists of a preliminary consultation agreement in 
which entrepreneurs agree to consult with VCs before the board 
decides certain subjects, including business judgment matters in 
                                                                                                                
120. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 75. A 2007 METI study indicates that 60.2% 
of Japanese venture capital investments were financial institution-affiliated, while 
independent VCs only made up 12.9% of investments; in contrast, independent VCs 
made 83.9% of all venture capital investments, while financial institution-affiliated 
investments accounted for only 8.8% of total investments made in the United States. 
METI, supra note 19, at 61. 
121. See HASEGAWA supra note 26, at 57; METI, supra note 19, at 65. Kneller 
reports that although private pension funds have been free to invest in ventures since 
1999, the percentage of pension assets invested in pre-IPO ventures in Japan is only a 
small fraction of pension assets invested in the United States. KNELLER, supra note 47, at 
171. According to the Venture Enterprise Center (VEC), pension funds’ share was only 
1.5% in fiscal year 2008. 
122. The average IRR of Japanese VCs is much lower than that of their US and 
European counterparts. See METI, supra note 19, at 63. 
123 . Average accumulated investment per fund is US$16.8 million for 
government backed VC funds, US$13.1 million for securities firm backed VC funds, 
US$13.4 million for insurance company backed VC funds, US$7.9 million for 
independent VC funds, US$6.6 million for business company backed VC funds, US$6.2 
million for foreign VC funds, and only US$1.8 million for bank backed VC funds. See 
Hasegawa, supra note 77, at 64, 72. 
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many cases.124 The second part is a stock buy-back agreement, a 
promise by the entrepreneurs to buy back the VCs’ stock at cost, 
personally in cases of breach of the shareholder agreements, 
and, in some cases, if no IPO occurs within a certain time 
period. 125  VCs do not necessarily intend to monitor the 
entrepreneurs they support, but intend to avoid downside risk, 
an act similar to that taken by most Japanese banks.126 The 
ubiquity of this contractual practice is one of the reasons why 
Japanese venture capitalists are not trusted by entrepreneurs. 
CONCLUSION 
There seems to be a relentless cycle involved in the 
Japanese venture capital market. Although venture capitalists 
gain some informal control, they cannot gain enough control to 
reduce the risk of venture investments. Therefore, venture 
capitalists are unable to invest larger sums of money in a single 
start-up. Instead, they are forced to spread their risks by 
investing small amounts in many companies, acting more like a 
bank. 
Entrepreneurs are not willing to forego formal control 
because they do not trust venture capitalists and find it difficult 
to find third-party references for reassurance. This may simply 
be because the venture community in Japan has not yet matured 
enough to organize into a Silicon Valley-type reputational 
market. Also, entrepreneurs do not have sufficient cash-flow 
incentive to cause them to abandon control, partly because the 
tax law is prohibitively restrictive when it comes to the use of 
sweat equity. This persistent problem limits the overall 
                                                                                                                
124 . Among the subjects of preliminary consultation, there are not only 
shareholder’s meeting matters and board meeting matters, but also often include an 
annual business plan and an annual budget plan. See Takahara, supra note 78, at 415. 
125. See id. According to research by METI, 70% of investment contracts include 
such a stock buy-back agreement, while 7% of them were actually executed. See METI, 
supra note 19, at 93, 95–96. 
126. Such a practice elucidates the bank-centered capital market influence. 
Japanese venture capitalists can trace this practice to similar practices by “main banks.” 
Another possible reason for this practice is different tax treatment of the “zombie 
corporation.” In the United States, investors can deduct certain investments if the 
portfolio company is doubtful as a going concern. Investors have to actually sell the 
stock for deductions in Japan. See Miner & Sato, supra note 27, at 129; METI, supra note 
19, at 57–58. 
1122 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1087 
availability of financing for Japanese venture companies, leading 
both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to accept a reality 
where smaller successes have become the expected norm. 
In Silicon Valley, the two-sided agency problem has been 
solved by making entrepreneurs cede control to VCs. Why is this 
resolution not applicable to Japan? The reasons why Japanese 
entrepreneurs refuse to cede control are complementary to one 
another. 
Black and Gilson’s logic does not explain the Japanese 
situation because their proposition requires the existence of a 
Berle and Means world where management can maintain 
control based on dispersed ownership of the stock, which is 
lacking in the Japanese stock market. In Japan, stock ownership 
of publicly held corporations has traditionally been stabilized by 
bank centered cross shareholding.127 Likewise, Hellmann’s logic 
does not explain the Japanese situation because his propositions 
require economically reasonable entrepreneurs and sweat equity 
as a complement to abandoning control, which do not exist in 
Japan. 
Although the situation is due in part to the unique culture, 
capital market, and reputational market present in Japan, the 
legal system clearly plays an important role as well. Japanese 
corporate law is based on the shareholder choice doctrine and 
stock majority is more important than in the United States. This 
results in Japanese entrepreneurs that are very insistent upon 
maintaining stock majority of their companies. Board majority is 
less important in Japan and directorship entails a sufficiently 
high risk of liability to dissuade VCs from taking board positions. 
Therefore, the system does not provide a strong enough 
incentive to gain board control and so VCs are often averse to it. 
Moreover, Japanese tax law is unfriendly to the use of equity as 
an incentive. Sharing cash-flow rights cannot be complementary 
to sharing control because of the possible gift tax on sweat 
equity. The combination of these factors leads Japanese 
                                                                                                                
127 . Recently, banks have unwound their cross-shareholding positions, but 
cross-shareholding still remains common among business companies. See generally 
Hideaki Miyajima & Fumiaki Kuroki, The Unwinding of Cross-shareholding in Japan: 
Causes, Effects, and Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 72 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 2007). 
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entrepreneurs to desire to maintain control of their 
venture-backed start-ups. 
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APPENDIX 
Double Moral Hazard and the Incentive Bargain 
The incentives at play in the venture company context are 
ripe for game theoretic analysis. The ultimate objective for the 
parties involved in venture capital investments is to try and 
maximize their long-term benefits in the face of two types of 
risk. One type of risk concerns being excluded from 
management and profit, or what can be descriptively called the 
“risk of squeeze-out.” The other type of risk concerns the 
reliability of the promises to cooperate with each other, or the 
“risk of uncooperative behavior.” Within a venture company, 
the joint profit of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist is 
maximized when both parties cooperate, yet these two types of 
risk distort the incentive of each party to cooperate. This sets the 
stage upon which the game will be played out; to maximize its 
own interest, a party must not only reduce the risk it faces, but 
also reduce the risk the other party faces in order to induce 
cooperative behavior. 
FIGURE 1 (shown below) maps out these incentive effects. 
For discussion purposes, imagine a venture company, in which A 
(venture capitalist) and B (entrepreneur) are the parties. The 
interaction begins by using the mechanisms that increase A’s 
incentive to behave cooperatively. The two primary tools are 
value sharing and control sharing. Value sharing involves 
granting A an equity stake in the venture. The more equity A 
has, the more likely A will invest optimally in the joint enterprise 
(notice that only at one hundred percent ownership is A’s 
incentive perfectly optimal). Control sharing involves giving A 
rights within the organization that can be used to limit B’s 
actions. One notable example is the use of defensive monitoring 
contracts. 128  These can be structured so that A will have 
information rights that help A make sure B does not extract 
value from the joint project improperly. Similarly, obtaining 
board representation or veto rights over certain decisions will 
                                                                                                                
128. These contracts are defensive in that they are protective of A. That is to say, 
they grant A certain negative rights that help A prevent harm to herself. In contrast, an 
offensive monitoring contract would be an affirmative right granted to A, permitting A 
to force B to undertake some action. A paradigmatic example would be granting A the 
right to purchase a majority stock position or buy out B. 
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give A valuable rights that help make sure it shares in the profits 
of the venture at parity with B. 
These rights can also be thought of by looking to the risks 
they mirror. The risk of squeeze-out distorts the incentive to 
cooperate because a party is not incentivized to invest optimally 
when the other party can expropriate the fruits of that 
investment. At the same time, the risk of squeeze-out by one 
party helps monitor the other party’s incentive to cooperate 
through a threat of exclusion (illustrated by the arrow from left 
to right at the center of FIGURE 1). This occurs because the 
other party faces the risk of being squeezed out of the joint 
project at a later time if it does not behave cooperatively. In this 
way, the risk of squeeze-out monitors the promise to cooperate. 
A minority shareholding party always faces a risk of 
squeeze-out by the controller. A minority shareholding party 
also faces the risk of uncooperative behavior by the controller. 
This combination understandably leads to underinvestment by 
minority parties. 
The majority party that faces no risk of squeeze-out can 
decrease his risk of being the victim of uncooperative behavior 
by using the threat of exclusion as a penalty, but he cannot 
entirely eliminate the risk of uncooperative behavior. As the 
controller’s threat of squeezing out an uncooperative minority 
becomes more credible, the minority party’s incentive to behave 
uncooperatively shrinks. But because the minority party knows 
that it may invest in the venture only to be squeezed out later, 
the minority party can still be expected to under-invest in the 
venture. Thus, the asymmetry affecting this equilibrium is that 
when a majority party has an absolute right to squeeze out a 
minority, the majority party will have optimal investment 
incentives but the minority party will under-invest. 
Methods to decrease these risks are limited to activities like 
equity sharing, board sharing, monitoring contracts, reputation, 
bargaining power, and contingent contracts.129 The interplay of 
                                                                                                                
129. Contingent contracts, accompanied by legal enforcement, can decrease the 
risk of uncooperative behavior. The comprehensiveness of contingent contracts 
depend on the nature of the transaction. For those conflicts that are predictable, 
contingent contracts are an effective solution. However, assuming that the contracts 
will be incomplete in some material respect, some issues cannot be resolved through 
contingent contracts. 
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these devices and the parties’ ability to use them to combat 
various risks are responsive to the type of risk involved, as 
illustrated in FIGURE 1. 
Reputation and bargaining power can work to decrease 
both the risk of squeeze-out and the risk of uncooperative 
behavior. 
If neither party enjoys a sterling reputation nor operates in 
an industry where reputation is particularly important, then 
neither party can be expected to make significant investments 
based upon reliance on the other party’s reputation. How 
effectively the reputational mechanism works depends on the 
reputational market. A reputational market is an integral 
infrastructure of the incentive bargain. 
The relative bargaining power of the parties is likely 
established by the relative value of the capital they contribute to 
the joint project. A party contributing only financial capital will 
essentially be forced to rely only on bargained-for contractual 
rights and votes attached to equity investments. This is the 
reason why venture capitalists invest using staged financing. If 
venture capitalists made their investment all at once, they would 
lose significant bargaining power against entrepreneurs. 
Although in most cases the relative bargaining power of the 
parties is apparent, venture capitalists can gain additional 
bargaining power through staged financing arrangements, even 
without a legal contract. 
Therefore, the alternatives that the parties can negotiate ex 
ante are equity sharing, board sharing, staged financing, and 
monitoring contracts. 
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